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tions, "What are we; What are we doing here; and whence do we come and whither do we go?" *are the very cause of philosophy's existence*; and that the *future* (italics mine) will give back to philosophy its rightful place—the first.

Professor Bergson does not think that we can arrive at objective certitude or that we can force assent, but he suggests that the collection of many facts and their interpretation may give us a direction, "a direction only." These "lines of facts" will give nothing but a probability; "but all together, by converging on the same point, may give us an accumulation of probabilities which will gradually approximate *scientific certainty*."

It is a pleasure to see the view I have been contending for—that to this present discredit of the intellect, of philosophy, there will come a reaction—confirmed by the high authority of Professor Bergson. How far the reality to be known may exceed the power to know I cannot tell, but this seems reasonable, that the universe has an intellectual answer to those intellectual questions with which it continually confronts us. There is in us the indomitable belief that the terror and mystery of the material world may be transformed by a large knowledge into "transparent formulae." Should we not have the same belief that the terror and mystery of the moral and religious worlds may be also, by a larger intelligence, transformed into "transparent formulae"?

My study must end here, and I am aware how imperfect it has been, but I have tried to represent Professor Bergson kindly and impartially. This task has not been easy for, as Mr. Balfour says, there are parts of his theory, especially his theory of knowledge, difficult to comprehend; but I am sure all will consent that he has broken open new ground, and we can admit even the exaggeration of Professor James: "Open Bergson and new horizons loom on every page you read. It is like the breath of the morning and the song of birds."

JAMES G. TOWNSEND.

JAMESTOWN, N. Y.

THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT OF TO-DAY.

Never before in the history of the world has science played such a prominent part and received more recognition as the main factor of civilization. And in truth there is a general agreement as

to the hope that we stand at the threshold of the age of science, which means that all problems of life will be solved by scientific inquiry and the old superstitions will be swept away. This principle has been applied to the several domains of life, to transportation, to sanitation, to the preparation of food and medical problems, the building of our homes and public edifices, yea even to the sphere of social and religious life. It is strange, however, that in these very days there have repeatedly appeared philosophical movements which are decidedly anti-intellectual, and treat science with a contempt in favor of the instinctive promptings of sentiment, which is only paralleled among the most old-fashioned dogmatists, in the tendencies of religious faith by such men as Augustine and Luther who treat reason as an enemy to faith, and endorse the old principle *Credo quia absurdum*.

We will here make a few comments in explanation of this movement without taking sides either with the admirers or the critics of the new fashion. The latter, the critical aspect, is most exactly represented by Mr. Bertrand Russell, pages 321 to 347 of the present number of *The Monist*; the other to some extent by the Rev. Dr. James G. Townsend. Mr. Russell points out that "if he (Bergson) fails in his condemnation of the intellect, the intellect will succeed in its condemnation of him."

It seems rather strange that in the days of the dawn of an age of science such movements should be so prominent, but it seems to me that these movements are the natural reaction against the many wrong aspirations of science, for it can not be denied that the prominence which science has gained in our days has also produced a number of narrow-minded scientists, who apply their narrow view of science to the whole of life. To them science is either physics or chemistry or biochemistry, or whatever their specialty may be, and most of them are acquainted with science only in its lower branches, mechanics or physics or some other domain which is void of the higher development of man where it unfolds itself in social and moral ideas. Psychology to such minds is a mere function of the brain, and the truly typical features of the soul are an accidental by-play of its coarsest substratum, or to draw their ultimate conclusion, mind is considered a function of matter. Their view of nature is limited, and while they rob man of his nobility they degrade him into an equality not only with the brute but even with inanimate existence.

The expression of this kind of narrow-minded science which

is not true science but the lowest step in the development of science, has caused a distrust in the true nature of science.

Anti-intellectualism has become fashionable in the philosophical world. Prof. William James made a great propaganda for it and succeeded mainly by his amiable personality. He speaks in the name of a certain common sense which stands up for unscientific views and defends a pluralism as well as a subjectivism on the ground that it is based on experience. For the same reason theory is discredited for sheer love of single and unrelated facts. Facts, however, are replaced by interpretations of a very primitive kind, among which even belief in spirits plays an important part. This incoherent system which abhors all moralism and actually represents a reaction to the world-conception of savage life goes under the name of pragmatism. It has made many conquests and gained many brilliant adherents even in the stable circles of European scholarship.

Another center of anti-intellectualism has been established in France of which Henri Bergson has become the leader through his unprecedented brilliancy of style and oratorical talent. He has gained many adherents in his own country, France, and celebrated high triumphs in conservative England. He is expected in the United States, and we have no doubt that he will be welcome in the circles of all who are dissatisfied with the quiet and unpretentious method of patient inquiry and scientific research. Men of this type possess great zeal and they will naturally welcome an ingenious representative of their philosophic tendencies.

In the meantime the spirit of criticism is stirring in England, and we have before us a book which with all soberness reviews the significance of the new star which has risen on the philosophical horizon. It is written by Hugh S. R. Elliot, LL. T., the editor of *The Letters of John Stuart Mill*.^{*} Sir Ray Lankester, K. C. B., F. R. S., being invited to write a few words by way of preface to Mr. Elliot's book, says:

"I am glad to do this, not merely because I think that the books in which M. Bergson formulates those illusions are worthless and unprofitable matter, causing waste of time and confusion of thought to many of those who are induced to read them, but also because an unmerited importance has been attached to them by a section of the English public, misled by the ingenious and systematic advertise-

^{*} *Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson*. By Hugh S. R. Elliot. London, Longmans Green & Co., 1912. Price \$1.60 net.

ment of M. Bergson by those who amuse themselves with metaphysical curiosities. He has been introduced to us as a "great French philosopher." To those who in a thoroughgoing way occupy themselves in collecting and comparing and classifying all the absurdities which have been put forward as 'metaphysics' or 'metaphysical speculation' since the days of Aristotle, this latest effusion has, no doubt, a kind of interest such as a collector may take in a curious species of beetle. To the student of the aberrations and monstrosities of the mind of man, M. Bergson's works will always be documents of value. But it is an injustice as well as an inaccuracy to speak of their author as 'great,' or 'French,' or a 'philosopher.' . . .

"A main objection to M. Bergson's account of his own performances in the dark chamber [of the metaphysical x] is that he is not content with asserting (and expecting us to accept his bare assertion) that time is a stuff both 'resistant and substantial,' that consciousness is not always dependent on cerebral structure, that intuition is a true guide and the intellect an erroneous guide. Such escapades in the dark room astonish and interest only those who are unacquainted with M. Bergson's numerous predecessors in the maddening hunt of the illusive black cat. It is, however, a speciality of M. Bergson that having by mere assertion attempted to make us believe that he has grasped the black cat, and at any rate has in his hand some hairs from its tail—he proceeds in the same spirit to make absolutely baseless assertions about the domain of scientific fact—a domain 'tabooed' against him and his fraternity. He writes of the facts of physical science with the same careless assurance as that which we tolerate with indifference when he is disporting himself in the extra-territorial region of x . Having made his arbitrary assumptions about x , he proceeds in an inaccurate way to write about some of the well-ascertained facts of the structure of animals and plants. He promulgates novel opinions about them with the air of one who has given serious study to them, which, however, it is abundantly evident he has not. By a light-hearted perversion of the facts as to the structure of the eyes of animals and other such things, he endeavors to make them appear as evidence in support of his arbitrary and preposterous fancies about x ! In doing so he ceases to be merely an amusing juggler with the harmless creations of his own and other people's fancy: he becomes a maker of untruth, and for those who listen to him a harmful *Confusionsmeister*.

"M. Bergson is gifted with an admirable facility of diction, and has succeeded in arresting attention. On that account, since he

has exceeded the limits of fantastic speculation which it is customary to tolerate on the stage of metaphysics, and has carried his methods into the arena of sober science, it is a matter of urgency that his illusions and perversions should be exposed with uncompromising frankness to the reading public who may be, on their side, under an illusion as to the importance of his teaching. Mr. Elliot's book effects this exposure in a masterly way."

M. Bergson proposes the strange doctrine that perception does not reside in the brain of the perceiver, but in the object perceived,—a proposition which is bewildering, and among his arguments he declares it theoretically not inconceivable that matter should be perceived without sense organs. Such doctrines belong to the cornerstone of his philosophy, and as an instance of Mr. Elliot's critique we will here quote some paragraphs discussing M. Bergson's theory of pain and of memory. M. Bergson defines pain as an "effort to repair damage." Mr. Elliot writes:

"Just as perception is located in the perceived object, so Bergson alleges that pain is located in that part of the body where it appears to be felt. This is of course in opposition to the belief of physiologists, who affirm that the pain is really located in the brain, not at the nerve endings; and who support their contention by pointing, for instance, to the pain which a patient feels and refers to his foot after it has for years been amputated. I am not, however, concerned to defend a well-established fact: I wish only to point out Bergson's mode of refuting it. 'If [the pain] is not at the point where it appears to rise, neither can it be anywhere else: if it is not in the nerve, neither is it in the brain; for to explain its projection from the center to the periphery a certain force is necessary, which must be attributed to a consciousness that is to some extent active. Therefore, he must go further....' Here we get a chain of deductions, every link of which appears to be false. Why should any force be necessary? Why should that force be attributed to a consciousness? Why should that consciousness be active? It was one of Huxley's chief gifts to biology to have largely banished deduction from that science, by strongly insisting on the danger of traveling outside ascertained facts. A succession of deductions like this, in a physiological inquiry, is *a priori* almost certain to be erroneous. To me *a posteriori* there seems not even *prima facie* evidence in favor of any of them: and they are set against a fact experimentally arrived at!

"The doctrine of two kinds of memory is a complication of

natural facts that will not appeal to anybody. But the fundamental objection to it is that so often raised already: that there are no facts to support it. The Professor attacks the physiological view of memory: he adduces a number of facts, such as those of sensory aphasia, in opposition to it; and having destroyed it to his own satisfaction, forthwith we are presented with a new theory which is assumed to be true. This new theory is worked out in extreme detail; it is unaffected by sensory aphasia, but otherwise the only credentials it can produce are those of extreme unintelligibility. We have already had occasion to observe that a doctrine is safest from criticism when it is most difficult to understand. The fog is so thick that the critic is disarmed. I therefore make no specific attack upon it, beyond insisting upon the complete absence of evidence. Moreover, the attack on the physiological theory could scarcely convince any one but a metaphysician. 'If memories are really deposited in the cortical cells, we should find in sensory aphasia the irreparable loss of certain determined words, the integral conservation of others.' But it is not so. Now, what would a man of science consider himself entitled to deduce from this? Nothing further than that words are not represented in the brain in minute specific areas for each word, but that they are, or may be, represented in some other way, possibly still undiscovered. But what does Bergson infer? That the memories of words are not stored in the brain at all. He refutes a crude physiological hypothesis; he then assumes that the refutation applies to all possible physiological hypotheses, and thence jumps to his own theory. It would have been just as reasonable to found his own theory upon a refutation of Gall's phrenology. For phrenology was a thoroughly materialistic hypothesis; it assumed absolute connection between mind and brain, and definite localization of mental faculties in the brain. Phrenology has long been exploded, but no one (except a metaphysician) infers from that that there is no connection between mind and brain. A belief in that connection is in no wise shaken by the exposure of phrenology; nor is it shaken by the criticism of other crude attempts to localize mental qualities. These criticisms are effective only for the particular theories against which they are levelled. Hence we see that Bergson's theory of mind and matter is founded upon the same fallacy as that of the vital impetus—the fallacy which we stigmatized as the mannikin fallacy at the beginning of the chapter. In bald outline it is like refuting Mahommedanism, and then arguing: (1) Mahommedanism is untrue; (2) therefore all religion is untrue; (3) therefore all

morality is a superstition. We have only to point out that (2) does not follow from (1), nor does (3) follow from (2). In Bergson's works the second step (2) is invariably taken silently immediately (1) has been established. The great show of facts in his works are all connected with step (1), the criticism of adverse theories. Step (2) is then slurred over without a word of discussion, and the rest of the philosophy is taken up with step (3), which is just a hypothesis or guess, or intuition, having no connection with foregoing facts, but set out with such a wealth of words and analogies that the unwary reader quickly loses his way and is totally lost. In alliance with the main paralogism is the copious misuse of analogies and of words, the latter especially in the form of materializing abstractions such as time, life, motion, memory. The medieval realists could scarcely have gone farther.

"The tendency to attribute substantial reality to abstractions is conspicuous not only in metaphysics but in the thinking of all primitive races. Thus a Basuto will not walk by a river lest his shadow falling on the water should be seized and devoured by a crocodile. Nearly all children at one time or another attempt to evade their shadows by jumping or running. Names likewise are looked upon as material things: as among the Chinooks, one of whom thought that Kane's desire to know his name proceeded from a wish to steal it. Here, as elsewhere, Bergson does nothing more than systematize and magnify, on an enormous scale, almost universal vices of thought."

As an example of Bergson's method we will quote a few more passages from Mr. Elliot's book. Bergson says:

"'Instinct is knowledge at a distance. It has the same relation to intelligence that vision has to touch.' Why, then, do we owe our knowledge of the stars to intelligence, and not to instinct? Why has astronomy advanced by the gradual triumph of intelligence over bigoted superstition?....

"Bergson's attempt to establish the preeminence of men and hymenoptera takes, in one place, the following form:—'It is unquestionable that success is the most general criterion of superiority, the two terms being, up to a certain point, synonymous. By success must be understood, so far as the living being is concerned, an aptitude to develop in the most diverse environments through the greatest possible variety of obstacles so as to cover the widest possible extent of ground. A species which claims the entire earth for its domain is truly a dominating and, consequently, superior

species. Such is the human species, which represents the culminating point of the evolution of the vertebrates. But such also are, in the series of the articulate, the insects, and, in particular, certain Hymenoptera. It has been said of the ants that, as man is lord of the soil, they are lords of the subsoil.'

"Under this definition, birds ought to be a dominating group, for their distribution is wider than that of men. And the most pre-eminent species of all would not be men, or insects, or even birds, but those simple unicellular creatures like ameba, which are found everywhere all over the earth."

Mr. Elliot sums up the whole book with the following conclusion:

"Professor Bergson's philosophy is contained in three volumes. I here summarize my main objection to the fundamental doctrine of each:

"1. Time is a stuff both 'resistant and substantial.' Where is the specimen on which this allegation is founded?

"2. Consciousness is to some extent independent of cerebral structure. Professor Bergson thinks he proves this by disproving a crude theory of localization of mental qualities. Will he furnish evidence of its existence apart from cerebral structure?

"3. Instinct leads us to a comprehension of life, that intellect could never give. Will Professor Bergson furnish instances of the successes of instinct in biological inquiries, where intellect has failed?

"I venture to think that, until these questions are answered, we are not called upon to consider further the merits of Professor Bergson's philosophy."

EDITOR.

KANT AND BERGSON.¹

"It is an incorrect and perverted usage of the word 'symbolic,' but one which is accepted by modern logicians, when it is set in opposition to the 'intuitive' mode of thought; for the symbolic is only a species of the intuitive."—Kant, *Critique of Judgment*.

We have in Kant not only the founder of criticism as a system or a method which would be appreciated for their positive qualities; but on the other hand the purely critical, or if you prefer negative, element is for the most part considered from an historical

¹ Translated from the German by Lydia G. Robinson.